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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the design of the secure network of the Enhanced
Internet of Vehicles Blockchain Governance Game by using the . The BGG is
the system model of the stochastic game to find best strategies towards
preparation for preventing a network malfunction by an attacker. The paper
applies the stochastic game model into the connected vehicle security.
Analytically tractable results for decision making parameters are fully
obtained which enable to predict the moment for safety operations and to
deliver the optimal combination of the number of reserved nodes and the
acceptance probability of the backups to protect the Blockchain enabled IoV
network in a connected car. This research helps for whom considers the
enhanced secure IoV architecture with the BGG within the decentralized
network.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Connected cars communicate each other based on vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
communication and it typically means that car are equipped with Internet access, and
usually also with a wireless local area network. Each care supports enhanced driving
aids for full autonomous driving by using the artificial intelligence (AI) and its
maneuvers [1]. The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is a superset of the connected car which
contains sensors, GPS, entertainment systems, brakes and throttles in the car. The IoV
is a moving network made up of IoT enabled cars through the usage of modern
electronics and the integrated information to maintain traffic flow, and to perform
more effective fleet management and accident avoidance. [2-3]. The IoV is connected
in an ad hoc network that uses each IoT component in a vehicle as a node [3].
Recently, adapting Blockchain technology with the IoV has attracted increasing the
attention of researchers and developers because of decentralization, anonymity, and
trust characteristics of Blockchain [4-6]. In the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), data sharing
among vehicles is critical to improve driving safety and enhance vehicular services.
To ensure security and tractability of data sharing, existing studies utilize consensus
schemes as hard security solutions to establish Blockchain enabled IoV (BIoV) [5].
Some studies have proposed a decentralized trust management system for vehicle data
credibility assessment using Blockchain with joint Proof-of-Work (PoW) and Proof-
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of-Stake (PoS) consensus schemes [6-8]. Vehicle manufacturers Volkswagen [9] and
Ford [10] have applied for patents that enable secure inter-vehicle communication
through blockchain technologies. In the view point of the IoT securities, several
studies are dealing with similar topics regarding the Blockchain based IoT securities
[11-13]. But most studies are based on surveys [11] and none of them are analytically
approached for design the network architecture for the Blockchain based IoT [12-13].
The Enhanced BIoV (EBIoV) network [14] is emphasized in this paper. The EBIoV is
the IoV network architecture based on the Edge Computing [15-16] with enabling the
Blockchain Governance Game (BGG) [17] for improving the network security [14].
Atypical BIoV could be applied to trace the provenance of spare parts back through
every step in the supply chain to its original manufacture date and location [14, 18].
Car manufacturers concern that service centers and garages are knowingly fitting
counterfeit spare parts to their vehicles of customers [15]. Counterfeit parts damage
the brand reputation when the parts becomes a cause of accidents. Identifying
geniality of car parts by using the EBIoV has been introduced in the previous research
[11] and it suggests that the network within car components is considered as the Edge
network and the monitoring equipment in car service centers are Fog level and the
database in the headquarter (HQ) is the level of the cloud network (see Fig.1) [15-16,
19].
Fig 1. Adopting Fog Computing in Auto Services in Blockchain [14]
This paper provides the mathematical functional of the EBIoV network architecture
for enhancing the securities from attackers. The EBIoV security regarding counterfeits
of the car parts already has been studied [14] and this research is focused on avoiding
atypical IoV attack in a decentralized network (i.e., the 51 percent attack). In the BGG
[17], an attacker and a defender compete each other by building blocks in private and
public chains as the sequence of stages to generate ledgers. The historical strategies
and the probabilistic stage transitions can be observed by both an attacker and a
defender. Hence, the interaction between the attacker and the defender can be modeled
as a stochastic game [17, 20]. This joint functional between two players of the
predicted time of the first observed threshold which is crossing the half of the total
nodes along with values of each component upon this time. The defender (a car
company) could take the preliminary action (i.e., request to add honest nodes as safety
modes) for protecting the Blockchain in a vehicle.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the Enhanced BIoV (EBIoV)
network and it describes how to construct EBIoV architecture of a vehicle by using
the BGG model in the IoV network as a stochastic game between an attacker and a
defender. Once a dishonest blocks are generated, the model predicts how many blocks
will be generated and the moment until more than a half nodes are covered by an
attacker. The moment of the decision making is also analyzed in this section. The
framework for setting up the mixed strategic game is provided in Section 3. The
optimal values of the blockchain governance in the EBIoV network for the
memoryless case are analytically calculated in Section 4. The memoryless property
implies that a defender does not spend additional resources to store past information.
II. S G F BI V N STOCHASTIC AME OR O ETWORK ECURITY
The Blockchain Governance Game (BGG) [14] has been tried to be adapted the BIoV
network architecture to defend against the attacks. This system model consists of one
attacker (i.e., the miner which intends to fork a private chain) and one defender (the
miner which honestly mines on the public chain) [20]. This explicit function
(Theorem BGG-1) from the BGG (Blockchain Governance Game) gives the predicted
moment one step before the 51 percent attack [17].
2.1. Enhanced IoV Network Structure
The proposed BIoV network structure is considered [14] and the components in a
vehicle, the equipment of a service center and the HQ database are hooked up as one
Blockchain (see Fig. 2).
Fig 2. Adapting BGG for the EBIoV architecture
Each car component beside the CPU (smart controller) generate the value based on its
mechanical action and the generated values are sharing with all other components
including assigned service centers and a company headquarter. Each number from the
car component is unique and randomly generated. And sharing these generated
number is the transaction value in the Blockchain network. The service center have
the database which contains the information from the cars which are served by the
center and the unique value based on the registered car database could be generated
for sharing with other nodes including a company headquarter.
Unlike atypical Blockchain network, the EBIoV network does not have reward system
which means that a heavy computation power is not required for being a miner to
generate ledger. All nodes even in service centers and a HQ have same contribution
power and the equal chance to be a miner. For instance, the node in the CPU is
considered as same as the nodes in other car parts although the CPU controls other car
parts. The Verifiable Random Function (VRF) is applied to select the node for
generating ledger [21]. The VRF is a cryptographic primitive that maps inputs to
verifiable pseudo-random outputs [22-23]. One Blockchain company pioneered the
use of VRF to perform secret cryptographic solution to select committees to run the
consensus protocol [21]. By applying the VRF, all nodes will have an equal chance to
become a miner for generating ledgers without requiring a heavy computation power.
The mechanism for protecting the Blockchain is exactly same as the BGG. The
governance in the blockchain is followed by the decision making parameter which are
includes the prior time just before an attacker catches more than half of the total
nodes. We will not take any action until the time when it passes the first passage time
and it still have the chance that all nodes are governed by an attacker even an attacker
catches less than the half of nodes.
2.2. BGG Models for Enhanced BIoV Network
To apply the BGG into the BIoV network structure, the antagonistic game of two
players (called "A" and "H") are introduced to describe the blockchain network in a
car between a defender and an attacker. Both players compete to build the blocks
either for honest or false ones. Let ( , ,  be probability space  S Y S Y Ya b TÑ ß ßE L
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will represent the actions of player A (an attacker) and H (an honest node). Player A
builds the blocks with false transactions and sustain respective build the blocks of
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The game is observed at random times in accordance with the point process which is
equivalent with the duration of the PoW (Proof-of-Work) completion in the BIoV
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where  is the number of the reserved honest nodes from a headquater (HQ) which isF
depends on the availability from the HQ. Since, an attacker is win at time 7/ ß
otherwise an honest node generates the correct blocks. We shall be targeting the
confined game in the view point of player A. The joint functional of the BIoV network
model is as follows:
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where  indicates the total number of nodes (or ledgers) in the BIoV network forQ
each car in Fig. 2. The Theorem BGG-1 (see Appendix A) establishes an explicit
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From (2.13)-(2.14), we can find the PGFs (probability generating functions) of the exit
index /:
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III. B G G SLOCKCHAIN OVERNANCE  AME TRATEGY
Let us consider a two-person mixed strategy game, and player H (i.e., a car company)
is the person who has two strategies at the observation moment, one step before
attackers complete to generate alternative chains with dishonest transactions. Player H
has the following strategies: (1) regular operations which implicates thatRegular 
the BIoV network in a car are running as usual, and (2) the network isSafety 
running under the safety mode for avoiding attacks by adding honest nodes from the
HQ. In the view of player A (an attacker), he might succeed to catch the blocks or fail
to catch. Therefore, the responses of player A would be either "Not Burst" or "Burst."
Let us assume that the cost for reserving the additional honest nodes is  where  is a- ,,
set of the factors that related with the reserved nodes from a HQ and these related
factors could be one value or multiple values. The headquater of the car reserves the
certain portion of nodes for protecting the values and the BIoV network. If the attacks
succeed to generate alternative blocks within car parts, the network bursts and the
whole value of the car  will be lost. It still has the chance to burst although theZ
defender (or a car company) adds the honest nodes before catching blocks by the
attacker. In this case, the cost will be not only the car value but also the reservation
cost for additional honest nodes. The normal form of games is as follows:
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Table 1. Cost matrix
where  is the probability of bursting blockchain network (i.e., an attacker wins; =a b2
the game) and it depends on the strategic decision of player H:
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It is noted that the cost for the reserved nodes (i.e., " " operation strategy ofSafety
player H) should be smaller than the other strategy. It is noted that the number of
reserved honest nodes from the HQ is random and this variable  has a certainF
probability distribution. Let us consider the number of the reserved honest nodes has
the binomial distribution with the success probability  and the number of trial . The3 8
PGF of the binomial distribution is as follows:
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The total number of reserved nodes  that a company owns depends on the cost8
function and the optimal number of reserved nodes  which supported by the HQ.8‡
Similarly, the optimal value  is the success probability when the reserved honest3‡
nodes are supported from the HQ. The best combination  could be found asa b8 ß‡ ‡3
follows:
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We would like to design the BGG adapted BIoV network that can take the safety
operation at the decision making moment . The governance in the Blockchain is7/"
followed by the decision making parameter. It also means no action until the time
7/". It still has the chance that all nodes are governed by an attacker if the attacker
catches more than the half of nodes at  (i.e., . If the attacker catches7/ /" " Q#˜ ™E  
the less than half of all nodes at  (i.e., , then the defender could run7/ /" " Q#˜ ™E 
the safety mode to avoid the attack at  The total cost for developing the enhanced7/ Þ
BIoV network is as follows: a b3.7
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3.1. Memoryless Observation Process BGG Model for BIoV Network
It is assumed that the observation process has the memoryless properties which might
be a special condition but very practical for actual implementation on a Blockchain
Governance Game. It implies that the defender does not spend additional cost of
storing the past information. To build the cost function of the BGG, we can find
explicit solutions of  ;!, :E"  and the moment of the decision making after finding the
first exceed index , the probability (generating function) of the number of blocks„ /c d
at the moment   .7 7/ /Š ‹ Š ‹„ „’ “ ’ “1 1" !E E/ / and  " " The functional  is defined on the·
space of all analytic functions at 0. It is also noted that the formulas (2.7)-(2.10) could
be rewritten as follows:
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The  (aka, the ) is the most important factor to beexit index first exceed level index
fully analyzed because the decision making parameters including the marginal mean
of   and  could be calculated easily if the  is fully analyzed. It7/ / /" "ß E E  exit index
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Since, the observation process has the memoryless properties, the process is
exponentially distributed and the functionals from (3.15)-(3.20) are as follows:
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From (3.34)-(3.40) and Lemma 1 in Appendix B,
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3.2. The Marginal Means of The Decision Making Parameters
As it is mentioned above, atypical decision making parameters are / 7ß E  and/"ß  /
E Þ/"  Although all decision making parameters could be fully analyzed, using the
marginal mean of the parameters is occasionally more efficient than finding an
explicit PGF of each parameter. The marginal mean of the decision making
parameters could be found as follows:
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Recall from (3.2), the probability of bursting Blockchain network (i.e., an attacker
wins the game) under the memoryless properties becomes the Poisson compound
process:
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IV. O PPTIMIZATION RACTICE
A network security in a BIoV network for each car is considered in this subsection.
The strategy for protecting the EBIoV is for supporting the additional nodes to give
the less chance that an attacker catches blocks with false control requests. The
example in this paper is targeting 16 IoV components for each BIoV network (15
nodes from car parts and 1 nodes from a service center) and the estimated car value is
around 50,000 USD (see Table I).
Name Value Description
16 [Component] Total number of the nodes in each BIoV network
50,000 [USD] Average value of a BIoV enabled ca
Q
Z r
25 [USD] Cost for reserving nodes to avoid attacks per each car
2 [Blocks] Total number of blocks that changed by an 
- œ 8
E
a b8ß
!
3 3
„c d attacker at 
32 [Nodes] Maximum number of honest nodes supported from the HQ
7!
Q
Ð œ !Ñ
8
Table I. Initial conditions for the cost function
It is noted that the values that describe above are made up only for demonstration
purposes. Since, the model of the BGG in the EBIoV network has been analytically
solved, the values for the cost function and the calculations of the probability
distributions are straight forward. However, it still requires the software
implementation by using a programing language. Based on the above conditions, the
LP (Linear Programing) model could be described as follows:
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From (3.7), the total cost  is as follows:Æ 3a b8ß Total a b4.4
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The total cost  could be minimized by given  and the parameter setÆ 3 3a b a b8ß 8ßTotala b8 ß‡ ‡3  is the optimal combination of the reserved nodes which are supported by the
HQ. The below illustration in Fig. 3 is atypical graph of an optimal result by using the
BGG based BIoV (EBIoV) network based on the given conditions in Table I.
Fig. 3. Optimization Example for the EBIoV
From (4.2) and Table II, the limitation of the success probability for adding nodes is
as follows:
3 Ÿ ß
Z † ;
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8 Q3a b a b4.9
where  is the maximum available reserved nodes per each car. For this example,8Q
the optimal cost is 1,700 USD (per a car) when the defender reserve the 82% of total
nodes which is 4 reserved nodes per each car for managing the risk from attacks. The
moment of requesting the additional nodes will be the time  when is one step7/"
prior than the time when an attacker catches more than half of the whole blocks (i.e.,
7/).
V. CONCLUSION
The  (EBIoV) is an enhancedEnhanced Blockchain enabled Internet of Vehicles
secure IoT network architecture for protecting a connected car from an attacker. The
EBIoV is designed based on the decentralized network and adapts the Blockchain
Governance Game (BGG) for improving the connected car security. The special case
is fully analyzed and demonstrates the optimization for reserving honest nodes for the
security improvements. This case shows how the EBIoV network could be securely
designed. The EBIoV is the first extended application research in the IoV security
from the basic theoretical model and it could be extended further to various
Blockchain based cyber security areas including IoT and decentralized service
network securities.
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